• =?UTF-8?Q?Re=3A_Boiling_G=C3=B6del=27s_1931_Incompleteness_proof_do?==?UTF-8?Q?wn_to_its_barest_essence?=

    From Mikko@mikko.levanto@iki.fi to comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy,comp.software-eng,sci.logic,sci.math on Thu Jan 8 12:21:15 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.ai.philosophy

    On 07/01/2026 15:06, olcott wrote:
    On 1/7/2026 6:10 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 06/01/2026 16:02, olcott wrote:
    On 1/6/2026 7:23 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 06/01/2026 02:24, Oleksiy Gapotchenko wrote:
    Just an external observation:

    A lot of tech innovations in software optimization area get
    discarded from the very beginning because people who work on them
    perceive the halting problem as a dogma.

    It is a dogma in the same sense as 2 * 3 = 6 is a dogma: a provably
    true sentence of a certain theory.


    ...We are therefore confronted with a proposition which
    asserts its own unprovability. 15 … (Gödel 1931:40-41)

    Gödel, Kurt 1931.
    On Formally Undecidable Propositions of
    Principia Mathematica And Related Systems

    F ⊢ G_F ↔ ¬Prov_F (⌜G_F⌝)
    "F proves that: G_F is equivalent to
    Gödel_Number(G_F) is not provable in F"
    https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/goedel-incompleteness/#FirIncTheCom

    Stripping away the inessential baggage using a formal
    language with its own self-reference operator and
    provability operator (thus outside of arithmetic)

    G := (F ⊬ G)   // G asserts its own unprovability in F

    A proof of G in F would be a sequence of inference
    steps in F that prove that they themselves do not exist.

     From the way G is constructed it can be meta-proven that either

    Did you hear me stutter ?
    A proof of G in F would be a sequence of inference
    steps in F that prove that they themselves do not exist.

    An F where such sequence really exists then in that F both G and
    the negation of G are provable.

    In an F where such sequnénce does not exist G is unprovable by
    definition. However it is meta-provable frome the way it is
    constructed and therefore true in every interpretation where
    the natural numbers contained in F have their standard properties.
    --
    Mikko
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  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy,comp.software-eng,sci.logic,sci.math on Thu Jan 8 08:18:30 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.ai.philosophy

    On 1/8/2026 4:21 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 07/01/2026 15:06, olcott wrote:
    On 1/7/2026 6:10 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 06/01/2026 16:02, olcott wrote:
    On 1/6/2026 7:23 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 06/01/2026 02:24, Oleksiy Gapotchenko wrote:
    Just an external observation:

    A lot of tech innovations in software optimization area get
    discarded from the very beginning because people who work on them >>>>>> perceive the halting problem as a dogma.

    It is a dogma in the same sense as 2 * 3 = 6 is a dogma: a provably
    true sentence of a certain theory.


    ...We are therefore confronted with a proposition which
    asserts its own unprovability. 15 … (Gödel 1931:40-41)

    Gödel, Kurt 1931.
    On Formally Undecidable Propositions of
    Principia Mathematica And Related Systems

    F ⊢ G_F ↔ ¬Prov_F (⌜G_F⌝)
    "F proves that: G_F is equivalent to
    Gödel_Number(G_F) is not provable in F"
    https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/goedel-incompleteness/#FirIncTheCom >>>>
    Stripping away the inessential baggage using a formal
    language with its own self-reference operator and
    provability operator (thus outside of arithmetic)

    G := (F ⊬ G)   // G asserts its own unprovability in F

    A proof of G in F would be a sequence of inference
    steps in F that prove that they themselves do not exist.

     From the way G is constructed it can be meta-proven that either

    Did you hear me stutter ?
    A proof of G in F would be a sequence of inference
    steps in F that prove that they themselves do not exist.

    An F where such sequence really exists then in that F both G and
    the negation of G are provable.

    G := (F ⊬ G) // G asserts its own unprovability in F

    A proof of G in F would be a sequence of inference
    steps in F that prove that they themselves do not exist.
    Does not exist because is contradicts itself.

    Rene Descartes: I think therefore thoughts do not exist
    is simply incorrect because it contradicts itself.

    In an F where such sequnénce does not exist G is unprovable by
    definition. However it is meta-provable frome the way it is
    constructed and therefore true in every interpretation where
    the natural numbers contained in F have their standard properties.


    Self-contradictory gibberish is never true or provable.
    It is better to reject it as gibberish before
    proceeding otherwise someone might make an
    incompleteness theorem out of it and falsely
    conclude that math is incomplete.

    This sentence is not true:
    "This sentence is not true"
    is true because the inner sentence
    is self-contradictory gibberish.

    This sentence cannot be proven in F:
    "This sentence cannot be proven in F"
    is true because the inner sentence
    is self-contradictory gibberish.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott<br><br>

    My 28 year goal has been to make <br>
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"<br>
    reliably computable.<br><br>

    This required establishing a new foundation<br>
    --- Synchronet 3.21b-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Mikko@mikko.levanto@iki.fi to comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy,comp.software-eng,sci.logic,sci.math on Sat Jan 10 11:25:01 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.ai.philosophy

    On 08/01/2026 16:18, olcott wrote:
    On 1/8/2026 4:21 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 07/01/2026 15:06, olcott wrote:
    On 1/7/2026 6:10 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 06/01/2026 16:02, olcott wrote:
    On 1/6/2026 7:23 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 06/01/2026 02:24, Oleksiy Gapotchenko wrote:
    Just an external observation:

    A lot of tech innovations in software optimization area get
    discarded from the very beginning because people who work on them >>>>>>> perceive the halting problem as a dogma.

    It is a dogma in the same sense as 2 * 3 = 6 is a dogma: a provably >>>>>> true sentence of a certain theory.


    ...We are therefore confronted with a proposition which
    asserts its own unprovability. 15 … (Gödel 1931:40-41)

    Gödel, Kurt 1931.
    On Formally Undecidable Propositions of
    Principia Mathematica And Related Systems

    F ⊢ G_F ↔ ¬Prov_F (⌜G_F⌝)
    "F proves that: G_F is equivalent to
    Gödel_Number(G_F) is not provable in F"
    https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/goedel-incompleteness/#FirIncTheCom >>>>>
    Stripping away the inessential baggage using a formal
    language with its own self-reference operator and
    provability operator (thus outside of arithmetic)

    G := (F ⊬ G)   // G asserts its own unprovability in F

    A proof of G in F would be a sequence of inference
    steps in F that prove that they themselves do not exist.

     From the way G is constructed it can be meta-proven that either

    Did you hear me stutter ?
    A proof of G in F would be a sequence of inference
    steps in F that prove that they themselves do not exist.

    An F where such sequence really exists then in that F both G and
    the negation of G are provable.

    G := (F ⊬ G)   // G asserts its own unprovability in F

    A proof of G in F would be a sequence of inference
    steps in F that prove that they themselves do not exist.
    Does not exist because is contradicts itself.

    That conclusion needs the additional assumption that F is consistent,
    which requires that the first order Peano arithmetic is consistent.
    If F is not consistent then both G and its negation are provable in F.
    The first order Peano arithmetic is believed to be sonsistent but its consistency is not proven.
    --
    Mikko
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