The halting problem proof fails under operational semantics
From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy,comp.lang.prolog on Wed Jan 14 18:14:25 2026
From Newsgroup: sci.math
The halting problem proof fails not because finite computation
is insufficient, but because it asks finite computation
to decide a judgment that is not finitely grounded under
operational semantics.
By “operational semantics” I mean the standard proof-theoretic
account of program meaning in which execution judgments are
defined by inference rules and termination corresponds to the
existence of a finite derivation.
By proof-theoretic semantics I mean the standard approach in
which the meaning of a statement is given by its rules of
proof rather than by truth conditions in a model.
This is the same sense in which operational semantics gives
meaning to programs via execution rules rather than denotations.
By denotational semantics I mean the standard approach in which
every well-formed program or statement is assigned a mathematical
object such as a function or truth value---independently of how
it is computed or proved.
This contrasts with operational or proof-theoretic semantics,
where meaning is given by execution or proof rules rather than
by an abstract denotation.
I use ‘denotational semantics’ simply to refer to any semantics
that assigns abstract mathematical meanings to programs independently
of their operational behavior.
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Copyright 2026 Olcott<br><br>
My 28 year goal has been to make <br>
"true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"<br>
reliably computable.<br><br>