I understand a schematic system is one whose deduction rules or,
perhaps, inference rules (if there's a difference) are specified as
axioms of the same system.
1. Can that be a syntactical system or a formal system just as well and
still be called a schematic system?
2. Suppose it's a positive intuitionist system, what are the most
notable things to consider vis-a-vis extensions?
On 1/15/2026 5:10 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
I understand a schematic system is one whose deduction rules or,
perhaps, inference rules (if there's a difference) are specified as
axioms of the same system.
1. Can that be a syntactical system or a formal system just as well and
still be called a schematic system?
2. Suppose it's a positive intuitionist system, what are the most
notable things to consider vis-a-vis extensions?
A formal system anchored in proof-theoretic semantics
with PA as its axioms expresses all of PA and is not
incomplete.
On 16/01/2026 00:24, olcott wrote:
On 1/15/2026 5:10 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
I understand a schematic system is one whose deduction rules or,
perhaps, inference rules (if there's a difference) are specified as
axioms of the same system.
1. Can that be a syntactical system or a formal system just as well and
still be called a schematic system?
2. Suppose it's a positive intuitionist system, what are the most
notable things to consider vis-a-vis extensions?
A formal system anchored in proof-theoretic semantics
with PA as its axioms expresses all of PA and is not
incomplete.
Well done, have a cookie.
On 1/15/2026 5:10 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
I understand a schematic system is one whose deduction rules or,
perhaps, inference rules (if there's a difference) are specified as
axioms of the same system.
1. Can that be a syntactical system or a formal system just as well and
still be called a schematic system?
2. Suppose it's a positive intuitionist system, what are the most
notable things to consider vis-a-vis extensions?
A formal system anchored in proof-theoretic semantics
with PA as its axioms expresses all of PA and is not
incomplete.
On 1/15/26 7:24 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/15/2026 5:10 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
I understand a schematic system is one whose deduction rules or,
perhaps, inference rules (if there's a difference) are specified as
axioms of the same system.
1. Can that be a syntactical system or a formal system just as well and
still be called a schematic system?
2. Suppose it's a positive intuitionist system, what are the most
notable things to consider vis-a-vis extensions?
A formal system anchored in proof-theoretic semantics
with PA as its axioms expresses all of PA and is not
incomplete.
Put you can't do that.
The problem is that the axiom of induction isn't compatible with proof- theoretics as I understand it.
That, or you end up with issues that the existance or non-existance of a number that meets a property might not be a truth-bearing statement, and--
you can't tell if it is, until you find the answer.
This makes "Truth" not a fixed quantity, which isn't very satisfying for
a logic system. Knowledge might change, but truth shouldn't.
On 1/15/2026 9:27 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/15/26 7:24 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/15/2026 5:10 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
I understand a schematic system is one whose deduction rules or,
perhaps, inference rules (if there's a difference) are specified as
axioms of the same system.
1. Can that be a syntactical system or a formal system just as well and >>>> still be called a schematic system?
2. Suppose it's a positive intuitionist system, what are the most
notable things to consider vis-a-vis extensions?
A formal system anchored in proof-theoretic semantics
with PA as its axioms expresses all of PA and is not
incomplete.
Put you can't do that.
The problem is that the axiom of induction isn't compatible with
proof- theoretics as I understand it.
As you fail to understand it. Look deeper.
G can be expressed in my system yet is
rejected as semantically non-well-founded.
That, or you end up with issues that the existance or non-existance of
a number that meets a property might not be a truth-bearing statement,
and you can't tell if it is, until you find the answer.
This makes "Truth" not a fixed quantity, which isn't very satisfying
for a logic system. Knowledge might change, but truth shouldn't.
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